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1. Introduction 
 
Over recent years, in the field of social sciences, a general consensus has 
emerged on the relationship existing between the role of the institutions, 
government, and economic development, especially at local level. The 
quality of local governance, more than other factors, affects the outcomes 
of public investments, hence also the long-term economic picture. The 
current forms of political intervention in Europe tend to overcome 
sectorial and hierarchical logics in favor of integrated policies, aimed 
above all at the production of local public goods where the territory, 
through its actors, recognizes itself as a whole, within a framework of 
reference whose central objectives are represented by territorial cohesion 
and polycentric development (Conti and Salone, 2011; Vázquez Barquero, 
2010; Boisier, 1999).  
Conventionally, the quality of local governance is fundamental when 
coordinating actions at all levels of administration, aligning policy 
objectives, improving the supply of goods and services, guaranteeing that 
local needs are represented and taken into account when defining policies 
on different scales (Rodrìguez-Pose and Garcilazo, 2015). 
As early as the 1980s, development policies adopted by the European 
Union reflected an increasing focus on territorial specificities and 
prompted processes of reorganization that were so profound as to impact 
on local identity trajectories. Indeed the strategies adopted had the effect 
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of reducing the potential for innovation afforded by bottom-up 
approaches, frustrating the ambitions of next generation strategic 
planning and, in the final analysis, limiting the variety of possible 
“futures”. 
Faced with a growing crisis in the model of local regulation, the loss of 
financial and political independence, the difficulties of management in 
situations that are complex and typified by marked uncertainty, several 
authors (Archibugi, 2005; Balducci, 1999; Bryson, 1995; Gibelli, 1999a; 
1999b; Curti and Gibelli, 1999; Mintzberg, 1994) highlighted the innovative 
nature of strategic planning and its capacity to overcome the limits of the 
traditional approach. In this context, since the turn of the millennium, 
strategic planning practices have also been adopted in the regions of 
Southern Italy, often in response to EU policy guidelines rather than on 
the basis of any previous stand-alone experience. So it was that, in 2005, 
with the European Union calling for innovation and democratic 
participation (especially in the Convergence Objective regions), the 
experience of strategic planning was initiated in the Southern Italian 
region of Apulia. 
Previous and current studies conducted on a regional scale show the 
limits and criticalities of the process and, more generally, of local 
governance. The effects, not only economic or in terms of the efficiency 
and effectiveness of investments, impact on regional planning in its 
entirety (rural and urban).  
The purpose of this publication is to reflect on the regional situation, 
beginning with an analysis of the processes of territorialization and 
Europeanization, followed by a presentation of the regional case, and 
finally proposing a retrospective interpretation of the now completed 
planning experience.  
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2. Territorialization and Europeanization2 
 
In the 1980s, the inclusion of ‘territory’ in the conception of development 
coincided with a clear tendency of governments and large international 
institutions to pursue neoclassical economic approaches that continued to 
consider growth as necessary, and to see its spread as a natural 
consequence of market mechanisms. In short, if on the one hand local 
specificities counted more and more (territorialization), on the other, the 
effects of pursuing a goal of universal development (free market growth) 
would naturally entail a diminishment of diversity. The ‘local’ card 
became the instrument of generalized growth that would lead to a 
homogenization of space (de-territorialization). In line with these trends, 
at the end of the first decade, European regional policy took on the nature 
familiar today, using structural funds as its tools and having cohesion as 
its goal.  
European space began to be homogenized through the effect of 
Community policies, and at the same time differentiated as the result of 
single market strategies at national level. The search for supranational 
integration prompted the formulation and adoption of strategies for 
increasing the attractiveness of territories and of investment locations. 
Thus, de-territorialization — reflecting the attempt to standardize the 
European political and economic space — advanced hand in hand with a 
process of re-territorialization which, on many scales, saw various and 
variable political coalitions seeking to reposition territories more 
attractively/advantageously within the changing global scenario. Moves 
toward integration, differentiation and rescaling had the effect of 
generating new combinations of rich and powerful cities/regions, strongly 
interconnected with one another, and areas characterized by marked and 
persistent economic and social marginalization (Brenner, 2004, p. 258).  
The free market turning point gave encouragement to strengthen the 
growth of cities and territories already strategically important for 
investments of transnational capital. Curiously, the regional imbalances 
and spatial differences that it was sought to eliminate became an absolute 
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precondition for the accumulation of capital and no longer presented 
dangerous barriers that could have destabilized this process (Brenner, 
2004).  
National plans and strategies focused on strengthening the 
supranational competitiveness of cities and city-regions. Whilst regulatory 
power was decentralized, investments in structures and infrastructures 
also started once again to be concentrated on areas of major strategic and 
economic interest. Government institutions and policies actively promoted 
“competition between localities, divergent local development pathways, 
international socio-spatial polarization” (ibid, p. 259). 
The EU drive toward institutional integration, from the 1990s onwards, 
was so strong that numerous studies show how many countries were 
induced to shape their regional planning systems to the objectives of the 
European Union (Moisio et al., 2013, p. 740). Europeanization affects the 
territory in its entirety, impacting on distinctively subjective and locally 
varied dimensions (Clark and Jones, 2008). In effect, and more generally, 
Europeanization seems connected to a global process of reorganization 
(Radaelli, 2004) involving networks and actors, which redefines the spatial 
reference framework of economic decision makers, involving political, 
economic and social aspects. In short, Europeanization is nothing other 
than a method of globalization. At all events, the process materializes as 
the affirmation of a scale of governance targeting the realization of the 
European project, formally, by way of participatory methods that 
reconfigure the territorial bases of authority, so that the supranational 
scale becomes dominant (Clark and Jones, 2008). 
Europeanization established, among other things, a principle of 
partnership between public and private actors, shaping a complex system 
of multilevel governance around the regions. In reality, the process of 
European integration implies a drive toward the sharing of a system of 
values that has direct effects on territorial identities and, as might 
reasonably be expected, could be seriously conditioned by the stronger 
identities with which it interacts.  
Given the effects of integration on development strategies, European 
competitiveness has come to be viewed as strictly dependent on the 
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externalities offered by global cities and metropolitan regions, where the 
majority of decision-making powers and central corporate managements 
are concentrated, resulting in a strong hierarchization of the European 
space (Espon, 2010). This seemingly confirms the importance of the ability 
to compete, depicted as a genuine goal to be pursued by making the most 
of territorial specificities. 
The question of Europeanization raises the more general question as to 
how development goals of endogenous origin can be made compatible 
with the objectives of policies formulated on other geographic scales (in 
this instance, Europe-wide).  
As Messina observes (2011), the spread and institutionalization of 
formal and informal rules impact profoundly on modes of development, 
through their regulation. Thus, the European Union conditions not only 
the “formal structures” but also the modalities (and the objectives) of 
development, albeit in very dissimilar ways from one region to another. 
In effect, the problem is particularly evident in cases where the 
resources to be employed in implementing policies are, entirely or in part, 
of European origin: how to reconcile the goals of non-local actors/funding 
providers with local demands and expectations?  
Currently, the objective of cohesion represents “the second source of 
spending by the European Union, after the Common Agricultural Policy. 
In the last spending round (2007-2013), the Union improved the multilevel 
management architecture that had from the outset characterized its 
regional policy, adopting a more explicitly strategic approach” (SGI, 2013). 
Compared to the deregulatory period of the 1980s, it is possible to see a 
renewed interest in the overall planning of the future. Compared to the 
prescriptive hierarchical models of the past, there is the mature awareness 
that representing the future might not be an operation of ingenuousness, 
but the fruit of a more or less explicit plan designed to build it, denying 
alternative albeit possible futures. The selection of desirable alternatives 
must be made through a process of ‘community visioning’ that targets the 
sharing and identification of compatible projects (Gibelli, 2005; Labianca, 
2014a). 
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It has already been seen how space, and social and cultural variances, 
have been included in the reference variables of development policies. It 
has been noted how the process helped to heighten attention on the search 
for competitiveness between territories on many, often unexplored scales, 
and how the EU rode and reinforced it in synergy with the acceleration of 
integration. Fragmentation and variety prompt the recourse to new 
methods of governance for coordination and for the management of 
conflicts. The strategic planning tool appeared to lend itself well to this 
purpose. Spatial strategic planning places the emphasis on territorial 
development and allows its definition in terms of specific investment 
programmes and regulatory practices, integrating different 
agendas/commitments/themes (economic, environmental, cultural, social 
and political) (Albrechts, 2006). 
Strategic planning is not limited to mobilizing public resources and 
providing solutions to problems: it is also capable of activating the search 
for creative solutions — territorially differentiated — by mobilizing a 
plurality of actors, even with divergent interests, aims and strategies 
(Albrechts, 2005, p. 271). Since the potential for conflict between 
individuals and communities arises systematically, multi-scalar 
governance must be structured in such a way as to ensure that local 
decisions are coordinated and made compatible with those adopted on 
other scales. Vision is essential to the creation of a future, envisaged on a 
given scale and at a given time, but it remains to define the manner in 
which that future will be built (ibid., p. 274). 
Planning is a process of political and social mobilization that introduces 
new ideas and activates further processes. On this basis, planning could 
help to enhance local institutional capital, strengthening and expanding 
relationships and capabilities. Self-evidently, the techniques and 
procedures of planning are not neutral. On the contrary, being conceived, 
selected and utilized as a consequence of social processes (Healey, 1997), 
they will always reflect the meta-project, which should be expressed as 
explicitly as possible, of those who propose them and those who help to 
implement them. 
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Often in Europe, the tendency has been to focus on wide area projects 
in terms of scale, and long term temporal horizons, making the most of 
participatory practices (Gibelli, 2005). The process of convergence between 
wide area strategic approach, cohesion policies and integrated planning 
underwent a marked acceleration between the previous planning period 
and the period just concluded (2007-13). European, national and regional 
development plans have in fact institutionalized the application of a 
strategic approach to integrated planning. 
This obviously is what has also happened in Italy, where experiences of 
strategic planning (tried out in a number of big and small-medium size 
cities) have been measured against and become influenced by those of 
integrated planning (SGI, 2013) based on place-based inter-municipal 
cooperation (experimented on sub-regional scale) that has its roots in the 
first Leader experiences and in territorial pacts. 
The national strategic plan for rural development and the national 
strategic framework for the 2007-2013 planning period set the objectives 
that must be pursued on the sub-national scale. The stronger levels of 
participation are seen to occur at the stage of transfer to regional and sub-
regional communities during the design process. At this level, the 
objectives are defined (for local actors, representing an exogenous 
variable), whereas the choice of tools and methods of implementation is 
left to local negotiation and creativity. 
In the regions where the resources to be utilized are mainly external, 
inclusion/exclusion mechanisms undergo significant distortions. 
Consequently, policies and projects indicate development goals on a 
territorial scale that often do not coincide with the social space on which 
they will take effect. 
Also, identity is often associated, both in literature and in planning 
documents, with the local availability of ‘resources’ (Labianca, 2014a). The 
obsessive search for ‘vocations’ — which through bold though not always 
realistic product differentiation routes can successfully project territories 
onto international markets — tends to limit rather than expand the range 
of possible trajectories open to local systems. Understood in these terms, 
identity places restrictions on pathways, betrays expectations, reduces 
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sharing; the constraints imposed by the process of Europeanization on 
objectives also extend to the tools and the solutions (and the failures) of 
governance. 
The scenario is complicated further by the persistence of substantially 
sectoral development policies. Policies will reference plans and projects 
which, although organic to the meta-objective of competitive growth, are 
not always consistent and/or mutually informed. Overlaps occur between 
regulatory institutions, often specific to particular spheres of action (urban 
and rural, for example), and service institutions which, while dedicated to 
more modest objectives of a ‘spending review’ nature, nonetheless play 
their part in generating proximity effects that clash with those generated 
by other institutions. Likewise in this instance, with the pursuit of 
development policies based on participation (never fully achieved, in 
reality), the idea was to overcome the fragmentary implementation of 
actions and projects, but (as noted by Rizzi and Dallara, 2005) this proved 
to be complicated, and coordination with other restrictive forms of 
planning was often impossible, thus multiplying the inevitabilities of 
confrontation and occasions of conflict. 
 
 
3. Development, identity and cooperation in regional planning  
 
In the field of urban and territorial policies, a reference framework took 
shape that would find agreement on a number of key concepts: a bottom-
up approach, integrated as concerning development and multisectoral as 
concerning political action, agreement and negotiation between different 
actors, formal contractualization of the various interests involved, a 
strategic approach to planning3, recognition of the strategic and ‘pilot’ role 
of the regional level, of local identities and of democratic participation 
(Labianca, 2014a). In practice, as already noted, all this produced a range 
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concerted and multi-level system of implementation”. 
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of different and not always noteworthy effects in the various Italian 
regions. 
More specifically, in the case of the Apulia region, this approach to 
development was highlighted especially in the 2007-2013 planning cycle, 
first and foremost in the sphere of wide area planning. With impetus from 
the Community, and by virtue in particular of having access to certain 
resources of the previous planning cycle, continuing with and 
institutionalizing the experience of the ITPs (Integrated territorial 
projects)4 the region set in motion an ambitious process through the 
introduction of the strategic planning tool, extending its application to the 
regional territory (De Rubertis, 2010; 2013a; 2013b; De Rubertis et al., 2013; 
2014). In many ways, the Apulian experience is emblematic of the process 
in question. In 2005, the region embarked on a course designed, on the one 
hand, to favour territorial self-organization (creating Wide Areas), and on 
the other to support initiatives having a high degree of experimentation 
(ibid). Regional organization, adopting an innovative approach based on 
strategic planning and on democratic participation, confirmed the 
importance and the full recognition of identity-related values in the 
different territories. Compared to traditional forms of planning and 
institutionalized democratic participation, the intention, viewed from a 
programmatic standpoint, was to launch and consolidate “community 
visioning” practices at regional level. In effect, these practices can address 
complex issues and problems of urban development, allowing the 
construction of alternative scenarios (shared vision of development 
anchored more firmly in the values of the whole community), through 
broad consultation and concertation processes. This purposeful approach 
emerges clearly from the analysis of regional documents, as also does the 
role attributed to territorial identity (Labianca, 2013; 2014a). 
The macro-objectives established under the Regional Strategic 
Document and recurring in wide area plans, able to guarantee 
development of the Apulian system, can be correlated substantially to a 
general increase in the competitiveness of territories, in terms of attracting 
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tourism and outside capital investments. Nonetheless, recognition of the 
role played by local actors and resources in favouring regional 
development requires thought on both the theoretical and the empirical 
level, or as indicated by Governa (2005), “on the territorial domains in 
which these processes are applied”. In the case of Apulia, as noted in 
previous papers (De Rubertis, 2010; 2013a; 2013b; De Rubertis et al., 2013; 
2014; Labianca, 2013; 2014a), this raises two kinds of issues: on the one 
hand, identifying and evaluating forms of proximity of the organizational 
and strategic orders that have succeeded one another over time; on the 
other, the methods applied in identifying and interpreting territorial 
specificities and characteristics. The delimitation of boundaries, albeit left 
to the discretion of the single municipalities, would seem to have been 
dictated by custom, by opportunistic choices that have thwarted attempts 
at innovation in the area of local governance, and moreover, the 
identification and representation of local specificities appears to have been 
based on a mere stocktaking of local assets rather than derived “from the 
collective action of subjects as bringers of experience and builders of 
knowledge” (Governa, 2005) that would reflect the sharing of territorial 
values, and active involvement of the local community. Also, studies 
conducted on regional planning documents (De Rubertis, 2010; 2013a; 
2013b; Labianca, 2014a) reveal a systematic alignment of visions proposed 
by the different territories in response to regional (and on occasion, 
national and European) guidelines and objectives. Thus, rather than being 
an expression of representations, of local expectations, these visions end 
up becoming redundant slogans. Strategic plans offer descriptions and 
context analyses that are strongly reductionist, and what is more, there are 
no clear indications on how the local development project should actually 
be implemented. The plan consequently becomes a mere exercise in 
rational-determinism, in the hands of subjects operating from outside the 
context of reference. As already discussed (De Rubertis, 2010; 2013a; 
2013b; De Rubertis et al., 2014; Labianca; 2013; 2014a), the territories have 
been severely hampered in the formulation of development projects, 
regarding both substance and interpretation, by the restrictive and rigid 
nature of the Regional Strategic Document. The constraints with which the 
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territories had to comply — in order to access funding — inevitably 
influenced the subsequent planning phase, which in turn would be 
characterized by a pronounced ideological dimension and a general 
dumbing-down of the visions that had been formulated. 
Also, if on the one hand the value and the role of identity in territorial 
development is recognized, emerging clearly on the other is the use of 
identity as a mere ‘brand’ or a generic channel for upgrading or enhancing 
key elements of local historic, naturalistic and architectural heritage, 
concentrated especially in the bigger or more influential municipalities, 
above all with the promotion and facilitation of tourism in mind. These are 
predominantly factors and resources linked to economic growth targets, 
unquestionably favoured over others (anthropic, social). Consequently, the 
territory is seen as a passive substrate on which to apply standardized 
packages of measures, exogenous in origin, irrespective of what might be 
the actual problems, specificities, local resources, and above all, local 
expectations (Labianca, 2014a).  
In reality, if wide area planning was predicated on an innovative and 
more wide-ranging approach to development, it would also be shackled 
by weak integration with other cooperation and planning tools, in 
particular at rural level. Here too, the effectiveness of building a 
development project from the bottom up is undermined in practice by the 
strong sway of regional control. Similarly, the objectives appear hetero-
determined and the territory is once again “reduced from a subject to a 
tool of development” (De Rubertis, 2013b, p. 123). Strategies, diluted and 
focusing on sectoral and agricultural growth objectives, are coordinated 
weakly with other plans and tools, consequently enfeebling the approach 
overall (ibid).  
And so, the absence of coordination and integration between policy 
areas, actors and projects reflects a significant criticality of the region. If in 
some territories there are good levels of overlap discernible (De Rubertis, 
2013b; De Rubertis et al., 2013; 2014; Labianca, 2014a; 2014b), stable 
partnership does not always lead to greater synergy or better 
performance. 
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On the basis of this survey, which recalls the main findings of previous 
research, it is possible to reiterate and confirm some observations 
regarding placement of the Apulian experience within a specific scenario.  
More exactly, as seen already (De Rubertis, 2013b) from the analysis of 
experiences in Apulia during the regional policy period — combining the 
two variables of policy objectives and local organizational/institutional 
(identity-related) structure — three possible scenarios emerge: adaptation 
of policy objectives to local institutional qualities; adaptation of local 
institutional qualities to development policy objectives; adoption of no 
development policy whatever. In the first scenario “the flexibility of 
objectives set by local policies is not infinite, indeed one sees a tendency 
for them to tighten up as Community policies are strengthened” (ibid, p. 
142). At local level, in the absence of financial resources, clients/funding 
providers should be willing to take stock of their expectations and render 
them more consistent with local practicalities. Even when this willingness 
is in evidence, the mechanisms of participation should function on all 
scales and at all stages of planning and implementation. However, as in 
the case of Apulia, the lack of appropriate participatory mechanisms, the 
constraints imposed on other (higher) scales and decisions made at local 
level have limited or precluded the possibility of formulating alternative 
development scenarios, more consistent with the local reality; in this 
situation “objectives therefore tend to be a variable exogenous to bottom-
up development planning” (ibid., p. 144). In the second scenario, whilst it 
is possible to recognize attempts at spontaneous adaptation of the 
organization to policy goals, it is somewhat improbable that this will 
produce an effective convergence between the two. In this situation, the 
organization of the project will be based on a predetermined level of 
sharing/inclusion and on a higher level of exclusion. Since the objectives 
are hetero-determined, participation will be encouraged mainly among 
supporters of the project, excluding alternative visions. In this way, the 
development project will be strongly aligned with the stated objectives, 
and the identity to which territorial diagnostics are referred is often 
determined by “taking stock of ‘local assets’”, the emphasis here being 
placed on themes or aspects strictly consistent with the objectives of the 
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main programme, as this is a requirement for gaining access to available 
funding. In the case of the third scenario, adopting no development policy 
whatever does “not signify taking up an ineffectual position”, but rather, 
favouring approaches and projects formulated on other scales, without 
being explicitly involved (ibid., pp. 144-145). 
Then, by combining an existing classification in literature (see Gibelli, 
1999b) that separates strategic plans into three ‘families’, with different 
sources, it is possible to identify specific modes of integration and of 
participation on the part of actors and territories, corresponding to the 
different types of plan. Given this pattern, which sets out to identify and 
summarize the features of the three types of plan, it should be possible to 
match one of them to the Apulian experience.  
Currently, the ineffectiveness and the reality of democratic 
participation, the constraints and objectives set on other (higher) scales 
which have thus limited or rather precluded the possibility of formulating 
alternative development scenarios more consistent with local 
circumstances, the identity explored by territorial diagnostics, consisting 
in an inventory of local assets, the consequent standardization and 
dumbing-down of planning models formulated by the different territories, 
the “hetero-determination” of objectives on other scales (regional and 
European) (substantially identifiable with the economic competitiveness 
and general attractiveness of territories), would appear to place the entire 
operation of regional planning, and not only wide area planning, chiefly in 
the second scenario.  
 
 
4. Conclusion  
 
As already discussed, strategic plans have shifted away from a top-down 
style of approach to development and moved toward a bottom-up 
approach. The gradual transformations in planning methods have brought 
with them a constant increase in the level of participation and integration 
of actors. In effect, the mere “consultation” envisaged under the top-down 
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approach has been replaced by participation and empowerment under the 
plans of the second and third generation, respectively.  
The different essences that have distinguished territorial planning over 
time did not develop in clear succession one after another; rather, they 
were characterized by significant overlaps and mutual influences in 
matters of policy and strategy on regional development. In Apulia, it is 
clear how the approaches adopted for planning tools (and more especially, 
the attempts at implementation) take in elements peculiar to one or other 
family of plans. Indeed when reading and analyzing regional planning 
documents for the period 2007-2013, one finds in the content that there is a 
significant inclusion of elements simultaneously representing different 
families of strategic plans. Moreover, the approaches and practices — also 
the specific definitions of the concepts of place, identity and territory 
adopted in the documents — reveal intentions that are not always 
consistent with the type of plan they claim to follow. 
In the more general sections of the framework documents (the Regional 
Strategic Document for wide area planning and the Rural Development 
Programme for rural planning), which set out the vision or development 
project for the territories, the construction of terms tends to suggest those 
of the third family of plans, namely linked-up and visionary. In the more 
practical sections of these same documents, the construction is strongly 
consistent with that of the first family of plans. 
This singular contradiction seems to indicate that the original pressure 
for change was not appropriately supported by genuine awareness, 
willingness and culture of innovation. Generally considered, the planning 
proposals are markedly standardized and oriented predominantly toward 
the creation of infrastructures, land use, and mobility-related works. The 
real ambition of the plans is discernible from a significant series of 
elements: the low level of participation by the community indicated as 
recipient of the integration/coordination actions; the strict observance of 
formal (and less substantive) aspects of the process, to the detriment of 
more flexible and informal “learning processes”; the absence of real 
institutional and organizational change; a reduction of the personality 
  
 
31 
associated with places to a mere inventory of resources ripe for human 
exploitation.  
These outcomes were probably influenced by context analysis based 
essentially on simplistic representations of the territory, conducted from 
the outside rather from the inside, which consequently ignore or 
underestimate the qualitative dimension of social phenomena. 
Documentary analysis reveals a strong contrast between what was 
hoped for, from a general standpoint, and what was actually delivered in 
the single territories and plans. From these, there emerges a strong 
alignment with the rational-deterministic line of planning. Territories are 
expected to organize themselves and to “implement” democratic 
participation in favour of a contractualist approach to planning. Without a 
genuine culture of participation, territories have often had to improvise 
the creation of networks, sometimes relatively closed, devoid of any 
proper shared, visionary project, and set up mainly for the purpose of 
’capturing’ European financial resources. 
So, if from a programmatic point of view the hope was to see a linked-
up and visionary model of planning that would entail, not least, the 
growth of empowerment, community visioning, integration and 
coordination between different policy areas, the reality was that in many 
instances, and often late in the day, territories adopted a planning 
approach involving no more than token participation, and digressions 
often of an opportunistic, standardized and sector-specific nature. These 
are limitations deriving from the adoption of a model for strategic 
planning that is neo-utilitarian in character, hence typical of the second 
family of plans. 
In this context, it is no surprise to see a lack of continuity and 
consistency between goals and strategies, and insufficient coordination 
and integration of planning tools: not infrequently, the results and 
experiences of previous projects are either cancelled out by new initiatives, 
or clearly in conflict with concurrent or competing projects. Each project 
addresses different territorial systems, attributing standardized identities 
and goals that are rarely shared with the local community. This is 
compounded by a high partnership turnover that has characterized 
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experiences concerned with integrated planning, fuelling situations of 
discontinuity and rendering each successive attempt at coordination more 
problematic. Consequently, participation — as already observed elsewhere 
(Trigilia, 2005) — merely reflects the sum of the goals expressed by single 
parties, rather than their actual integration.  
In short, for the three families of plans, one has three corresponding 
modes of controlling development, which in the case of Apulia (due not 
least to the joint effect of inflexibilities imposed by Europeanization, and 
local institutional specificities) have overlapped and influenced one 
another, sometimes even within the scope of the same single plan, 
producing decidedly problematic situations.  
To reiterate, combining the acceptable degree of hetero-direction 
applied in determining policy objectives with the local organizational-
institutional structure, it can be expected that three possible scenarios will 
emerge: adaptation of policy objectives to local institutional qualities; 
adaptation of local institutional qualities to development policy objectives; 
adoption of no development policy whatever. 
The three scenarios are identifiable with the possible methods of 
controlling development afforded by the families of plans examined: 
-the first scenario is compatible with the third family of plans, based as 
it is on the assumption that the fundamental participation mechanisms 
will function on all scales and at all stages in the design and 
implementation of the plan; 
-the second scenario corresponds to the adoption of approaches typical 
of the second family of plans, predicated on participation; this favours 
hetero-determined objectives (dictated by the EU) and starts from the 
assumption that formulation and organization of the project will be based 
on mechanisms of exclusion that limit participation, disallowing 
alternative visions (and the attendant negotiating hurdles);  
-the third scenario appears to be compatible with the first family of 
plans: the decision not to adopt any development policy, indicating a 
passive stance intended to support objectives and projects formulated on 
other scales, suggests a clear reference to this family (and therefore to a 
top-down development approach).  
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Clearly, in the light of the foregoing, any alignment with European 
guidelines on strategy and models of governance — not least when 
considering the future — must carry a significant risk that local visions, 
goals and planning ambitions will be dumbed down. 
It seems that a thorough examination of local identity-related 
specificities, possible territorial futures and the variety/variability of their 
representations is now urgently required, and should be conducted before 
undertaking any other action on development. In reality, the search for 
optimum territorial planning frameworks should be accompanied — or 
indeed preceded — by the identification of dependable solutions for 
coordinating strategies, actors and goals brought together on different 
scales, while allowing all parties to retain their own territorial and sectoral 
points of reference. 
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